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Abstract

which may cause congestion. The universal knowledge of
multicast addresses also allows any host to pose as a member
of the group, thereby allowing it to gain access to the multicast data. Finally, adversaries can possibly disrupt the multicast protocol itself by posing as legitimate members of the
group.
Multicasting is a scalable way of transmitting data to a
group hosts and any secure multicasting protocol must be
scalable as well. A secure group communication protocol
must provide group membership control, secure key distribution, and secure data transfer. If the multicast group membership is dynamic, i.e., if the groupmembers join and leave
during the course of a multicast session, the secret keys need
to be updated accordingly. In other words, members of a
multicast session must not be able to access the multicast
data transmitted before their membership has begun or after
their membership has expired. Scalability in this context implies that the overhead involved in key updates, data transmission and encryption must be independent of the size of
the multicast group. The other requirement of scalability is
that the addition or removal of a host from the group must
not affect all the members of the group. The second rule is
called “1 affects n” scalability problem [ 111.
Several protocols have been proposed to support secure
multicasting [ l , 4, 7, 9, 11, 14, 151. Based on the corresponding key distribution protocols, we can broadly classify
them into three categories, viz., centralized flat schemes,
distributed flat schemes and hierarchical schemes [4]. Centralized flat schemes [3,4,8,9] consist of a single entity distributing the encryption keys to the group members. These
schemes suffer from the 1 affects n scalability problem.
The distributed flat schemes trust all the group members
equally [4]. Members joining early create and distribute the
encryption keys. Trusting all the members makes this proto-

In this paper we propose a dual encryption protocol f o r
scalable secure multicasting. Multicasting is a scalable solution f o r group communication. It howevel; poses several
unique security problems. We use hierarchical subgrouping to achieve scalability. Third party hosts o r members of
the multicast group are designated a s subgroup managers.
They are responsible f o r secret key distribution and group
membership management at the subgroup level. Unlike existing secure multicast protocols, our protocol need not trust
the subgroup managers with the distribution of data encryption keys. The dual encryption protocol proposed in this paper distributes encrypted data encryption keys via subgroup
managers. We also present a class$cation of the existing secure multicast protocols, compare their relative merits and
show the advantages of our protocol.

1. Introduction
With the widespread use of the Internet, securing data
transmissions is an important requirement for many applications. Several protocols exist to address security in data
networks with respect to unicasting [6, 101. Unfortunately,
these protocols cannot be easily extended to protect multicast data. Multicasting poses several problems that do
not come up in securing unicast data transfers [2]. First,
multicast addresses are not private which enables any interested host to join the multicast session without any hindrance. Next, multicast data is transmitted over many channels of the network which presents multiple opportunities
for attacks such as eavesdropping. Furthermore, any host in
the Internet can send irrelevant data to the multicast group,
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col vulnerable to security attacks from inside the group. Finally, the hierarchical schemes [ 1, 4, l l , 14, 151 distribute
encryption keys via a distribution tree. The schemes proposed by Caronni et. al [4], Wallner et. al [ 141 and Wong e t
a1 [ 151 suffer from the 1 affects n scalability problem. The
other hierarchical schemes entrust the internal nodes of the
tree with the distribution of the encryption keys. But they
offer no mechanism to hide multicast data from these third
party entities.
We propose a dual encryption protocol (DEP) for scalable secure multicasting which supports one-to-many group
communication. We use hierarchical subgrouping of multicast members to address scalability. Each subgroup is managed by a subgroup manager (SGM) which assists in key
distribution as well as group access control. We distinguish
between participants and members of the multicast group.
Members of the multicast group are leaf nodes and internal
nodes (SGMs) in the key distribution tree, that are entitled
to the multicast data. On the other hand, participants of the
multicast group are SGMs that assist in enforcing the secure
multicast protocol without having any access to the multicast data. The dual encryption scheme enables our protocol
to hide multicast data from the participants.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We describe the dual encryption protocol for scalable secure multicasting in Section 2. Section 3 compares existing secure
multicast protocols to our protocol. The final section lists
our conclusions and describes future directions in this area.
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Figure 1. Capability certificate
keys to their corresponding subgroup members. The second set of keys called top level key encrypting keys (KEK)
are used by the sender to hide data encryption keys from
participant SGMs. We classify the members and participants of the multicast group into key groups. The members
in each key group get access to the same KEK. Nodes of
each subtree rooted at one of the sender’s children belong
to the same key group. Nodes of different subtrees rooted
at the sender’s children may belong to the same key group.
The number of key groups however is limited by the number of SGMs among the sender’s children. Our protocol uses
public-key [ 10, 12, 131 encryption for securely distributing
the top level KEKs and the subgroup keys.

Table 1. Notation used in this DaDer
S

Sender

SGM

Subgroup manager
Local subgroup key managed by SGM i
Set of subgroup members of SGM i
Set of nodes of the key distribution tree in the
key group i
Key encrypting key corresponding to the key
group K
Data encryption key used in encrypting multicast data
Capability Certificate of x
Authorization Certificate issued to x by s
Public-key of x
Private-key of x
Public-key encryption
Secret-key encryption
Hash value
x sends “w” to y

LS;

2. Anatomy of the dual encryption protocol

N.
K

In this section we describe the dual encryption protocol for scalable secure multicasting. Our protocol supports
secure one-to-many group communication, dynamic group
membership and is scalable. We use hierarchical subgrouping of multicast members to address scalability. Each subgroup is managed by a subgroup manager (SGM). SGMs
are either routers or hosts in the network that can handle the
workload of managing a subgroup of the multicast group.
We assume that the SGMs conform to the secure multicast
protocol and do not actively participate in disrupting it. We
distinguish between participants and members of the group.
Members of the group are end-hosts or SGMs that are entitled to the multicast data. On the other hand, participants
of the group are SGMs that assist in enforcing the secure
multicast protocol without having any access to the multicast data. With this distinction, it is possible to have SGMs
assist in the secure multicast protocol without getting access
to multicast data.
We use two sets of encryption keys that assist in secure distribution of data encryption keys to multicast members. The first set of keys called local subgroup keys (LS)
are used by SGMs to distribute encrypted data encryption

KEKj

DEK

ccx
AC,
KUX

KRx

EP
ES
HV
x

-+ y : w

We use capability certificates (see Figure 1) to enforce
group access control. For large multicast groups, access
control lists can be very large. Furthermore, we may not
know all the group members in advance. Our protocol requires that all the members obtain a capability certificate
from designated certification authorities. These certificates
authenticate hosts and authorize them to be members of
the multicast group. The authorization information also in-
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illustrate the concept of key groups, we use,the key distribution tree shown in Figure 2. There could be at most two key
groups, corresponding to each of the sender’s children that
are SGMs, viz., pl and gl. hl could belong to either one of
the key groups.
All the members and participants of the multicast group
must be aware of the key group they belong to. We delegate the responsibility of propagating this information to the
subgroup managers. The sender assigns and distributes key
group ids to the SGMs that are members of the top level
subgroup. Each SGM disseminates its key group id to its
subgroup members when they join the group. Thus, all the
members and participants of the multicast session are aware
of the corresponding key group id. Section 2.2 illustrates the
distribution of the secret keys as a part of the join protocol
of the dual encryption scheme.

cludes the time duration for which the group member is entitled to multicast data. The sender and the SGMs verify the
capability certificates before distributing encryption keys to
group members. We list the notation used in the remainder
of the protocol description, in Table 1.

2.1. Initial key distribution

2.2. Join protocol
When a new host h wants to join the secure multicast
group, it sends a message which includes its capability certificate, to all the SGMs of the group and waits for the first
positive response. SGMs that can handle the additional
workload of another member in their subgroup respond to
this request. They first verify the capability certificate to decide whether to approve or deny the request. Assuming that
the request is approved, each SGM validating the request
sends a message comprising of its identity and its key group
identity. h chooses the first positive response it receives to
pick the subgroup it is going to join. Let us say p1 (refer to
Figure 2) responds first. It sends its identity, p l , and its key
group identity, say E to h. Since p1 replied first, h chooses
p1 as its subgroup manager.
The enrolling host then sends a packet with its capability certificate, the responding SGM’s identity and the corresponding key group identity to the sender of the multicast data. The sender uses the capability certificate to decide
whether h is an authorized member of the multicast group.
It also checks to see if h has previously requested to join the
multicast. This last verification is to guard against a misbehaving host trying to join multiple subgroups simultaneously. After the new host’s membership is validated, the
sender generates an authorization certificate (see Figure 3)
for h. The authorization certificate contains the new host’s
identity (h), the corresponding SGM’s identity and the key
group identity. The sender signs the certificate with its private key. The authorization certificate is an authentic record
of the new host’s affiliation to the multicast group. Next, the
sender sends the authorization certificate and the top level
KEK to the joining host. The KEK sent to h corresponds
to its key group identity. The sender encrypts the authorization certificate and the KEK with h’s public key for secrecy. For example in Figure 2 the sender sends the packet,

-..- _- _ _- .- _ _ SGM as a participant

P2’ssubgroup

End-host as a member

Figure 2. Key distribution tree
Figure 2 illustrates the idea of a secure multicast key distribution tree. As depicted in the figure, members of the multicast group are nodes of a key distribution tree. The key distribution tree can be either an extension of a multicast data
distribution tree (e.g. DVMRP [5])or a virtual tree at the application level. Subgroup managers are represented by the
non-leaf nodes and the children of each of these non-leaf
nodes are subgroup members of the corresponding non-leaf
node. Each SGM is responsible for generating a secret key
and sharing it with all the corresponding subgroup members
in a secure fashion. For instance in Figure 2, pl shares the
subgroup key Up,with its children, g2 and h2. The sender
generates the top level KEKs and a local subgroup key for
the top level subgroup. Recall that the KEKs are used to
hide data encryption keys from the participants of the multicast group. One KEK is generated corresponding to each of
the key groups. These keys are distributed to the multicast
members by the sender. A KEK is shared by all the nodes
in a key group, that are members of the multicast group. To
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E P K ~E~P[K ~ ~ [ A CEPKR.~[KEKI]
~],
1. Note that the sender

follow the join protocol describedeartier. The only change

signs the authorization certificate and the KEK separately.
This allows h to produce the signed authorization certificate
without having to disclose the KEK. Finally, the sender updates its multicast membership database with the new host’s
authorization certificate. The membership database is used
when the sender refreshes the KEKs.

is that the sender updates its SGM database. Recruiting a
participant SGM, however, is more complex. The sender
first verifies if the participant SGM is an ex-member of the
multicast group. If the participant SGM is in the membership database, the corresponding KEK needs to be updated.
To change a KEK, the sender sends a message to all the
members which hold that KEK, asking them to request the
new KEK. The members which need the new KEK respond
with their authorization certificates. The sender verifies the
authorization certificates and constructs a list of members
authorized to receive the updated KEK. The sender then
changes the KEK, signs it, and encrypts it with the public
keys of all the members in the list. It then multicasts all the
encrypted KEKs to the multicast group. Each member waiting for the new KEK decrypts the encrypted KEK intended
for it. Finally, the sender updates its membership database
conforming to the authorization list it compiled above. After
the verification process and possible modification of a KEK,
the join process of a participant SGM follows the same protocol described earlier. The only exception is that a participant SGM does not receive a KEK.
Clearly, the process of changing a KEK is costly operation. However, KEKs need to be changed only when an exmember of the multicast group wants to rejoin as a participant SGM. To avoid changing KEKs frequently, an application may deny the join request of a participant SGM if it is
still in the membership database.

Host Id

Membership Duration

I

Multicast Group Id

.

Host Public Key

Key Group Id

I

SGM Id

Signed by the Sender

1-

Figure 3. Authorization certificate
In the final phase of the join protocol, the host sends its
signed authorization certificate to its SGM. The subgroup
manager first adds the new host to its subgroup members’
list. The SGM then changes its subgroup key, signs it, encrypts it with h’s public key and sends it to h. The SGM’s
signature guards against masquerading attacks. The subgroup key is changed to keep the new host from decrypting multicast data sent before it joined the group. Separately, the SGM multicasts its signed new subgroup key to
all its subgroup members, encrypted with the old subgroup
key. In our example, p1 sends EPKU~[EPKR,,~
[LSLI]]to h and
ESu,, [EPKR~,
[LS;,]] to g2 and h2. Table 2 lists the steps in
the join protocol. In the table, h joins the group at an SGM
g, which belongs to the key group -?(;.

2.3. Secure communication
The sender generates a data encryption key (DEK) to
be used in a conventional encryption algorithm [lo, 131.
It sends the multicast data encrypted with the DEK to the
group. Next, it computes a one-way hash function of the
data and sends the hash value (HV) along with the DEK to
multicast members securely. The members also compute the
hash value of multicast data and compare it to the HV received, to verify the integrity of the data.
While the encrypted multicast data is sent through traditional multicast channels, the DEKs are distributed via the
key distribution tree. We use the key distribution tree in Figure 2 to illustrate the DEK distribution. The sender generates a key distribution packet (ESU,~[ESKEK~
[DEK, HV]],
ESLS,~[ESKEK~
[DEK, HV]]), where LS, is the subgroup key
of the top level subgroup. Each of the sender’s children decrypts its part of the key distribution packet. Each of them
then encrypts its piece of the packet with the subgroup key
they manage and multicasts the encrypted DEK to its children. In our example in Figure 2, p1 multicasts the encrypted packet that contains ESLS,, [ESKEK~
[DEK, HV]], to
g2 and h2. Similarly, other SGMs forward the encrypted
DEK to their respective subgroup members. All the mem-

Finally, we want to stress the importance of the use of authorization certificates. They eliminate the possibility of an
adversary with a valid capability certificate gaining access
to all the keys managed by the sender and all the SGMs in
the multicast group. In our protocol, the sender checks for
duplicate joins by the same host before issuing an authorization certificate. These certificates authorize the joining host
to gain access to only one local subgroup key.
We now describe the join protocol followed by subgroup
managers. SGMs that are members of the multicast group
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ing SGM. After finding a replacement, the sender notifies
the members of the subgroup managed by the leaving SGM
about their new subgroup manager. The sender also updates
its list of SGMs. The new SGM follows the join protocol
to become either a participant or a member of the multicast
group. After that, it generates the subgroup key and securely
distributes that key to its subgroup members.

bers of the multicast group with a local subgroup key and
the corresponding KEK acquire the DEK and HV. The DEK
is used by the members to decrypt the multicast data and
HV is used to verify the integrity of multicast data. Note
that the SGMs that are also members of the multicast group
will have access to the corresponding KEK. Other SGMs
will just participate in the secure multicast protocol by managing their corresponding subgroup key and forwarding the
encrypted DEK. Table 3 lists the steps in the DEK distribution protocol. In the table, we assume that there are c key
groups and that SGM g i , which is one of the sender’s children, belongs to the key group K.

2.5. Key refresh
The sender and the SGMs refresh their keys periodically
to guard against eavesdropping.. To change the subgroup
key, a subgroup manager follows the same procedure described in Section 2.4. In brief, the SGM changes the key,
signs it and encrypts it with the public keys of all the subgroup members. It then locally multicasts the updated subgroup key to its subgroup members. Refreshing KEKs is a
complex procedure and is expected to be done infrequently.
The sender can change a KEK following the mechanism described in Section 2.2. In general, KEKs may be refreshed
depending on the frequency of hosts rejoining the multicast
group.

2.4. Leave protocol
The membership of a multicast group member may expire as per the membership duration information in the capability certificate. It is also possible that either the sender
or the corresponding SGM may have to expel a misbehaving member. In either case, the ex-member of the multicast
session must not be able to decrypt the multicast data. To
do that, the corresponding SGM changes the local subgroup
key. It then encrypts the new subgroup key with the public keys of each of its children and multicasts that information to them. Each of the children decrypts its part of that
message and extracts the updated subgroup key. Revisiting
our example in Figure 2, if the host hg leaves the multicast
group, the corresponding subgroup manager, p2 changes the
subgroup key and securely sends the new key to the hosts h8
and hlo separately.
Note that the KEK known to the leaving host need not
be changed right away. The sender can periodically change
those keys depending on the frequency of hosts rejoining
the group. Since any member needs to know both the corresponding subgroup key and the key encrypting key to decrypt the DEK, changing even one of them is sufficient. We
list the the steps of the leave protocol in Table 4. In the
table, we assume that hi left from SGM g, where !k$ =
{ h I , h2,. . . ,h,} and that LS; is the new subgroup key.
Dual encryption of the DEK simplifies the removal of an
SGM from the multicast group. All we need to do is to remove the SGM, find a replacement and notify the subgroup
members of the change. Note that each SGM is a member of a subgroup managed by its parent. The parent SGM
removes the leaving SGM, following a procedure identical
to that of removing a member of the multicast group. The
sender needs to locate another SGM that replaces the leav-

2.6. T h i n g the number of key encrypting keys
The number of KEKs can be between zero and the number of SGMs in the top level subgroup. When the number of
KEKs is zero all the SGMs automatically receive access to
multicast data. The use of a single KEK gives us the capability of denying access of multicast data to SGMs. However,
the KEK may need to be refreshedupdated more often since
it is shared by all of the members. As the number of KEKs
increase the refreshhpdate frequency decreases. The upper
bound to the number of KEKs is the number of SGMs that
are also members of the top level subgroup.

3. Previous research in scalable key distribution
We summarize the previous work done in the area of
secure scalable key distribution in this section. Most of
the previous work in the area of secure multicasting has
been in key distribution. We can loosely classify the existing schemes as centralized flat key management, hierarchical key management, and distributed flat key management
schemes [4].
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Table 4. Stem in the leave Drotocol

Centralized flat key management. In this approach
a single entity distributes the session key to all the group
members. The protocol suggested in Elements of Trusted
Multicasting [8] (ETM), distributes the session key encrypted with each of the group members’ public keys after multicast data has been sent. In Group Key Management Protocol (GKMP) [9], the group manager shares a session traffic encrypting key (TEK) and key encrypting key
(KEK) with each member. These keys are used in distributing the group TEK and the group KEK. The PerfectlySecure Dynamic-Conference Key Distribution (PDKD) [3]
protocol describes a secret-sharing scheme for secure group
communication. Each host in any group o f t members can
compute a common key, on input its share of the secret
and the identities of the other t - 1 hosts. In the Centralized Flat Key Management for Dynamic Multicast Groups
(CFKM-DMG) [4] the group manager generates a TEK and
2W KEKs, where W represents the number of bits in any
member’s ID. For each bit in the ID, there are two KEKs.
Each member receives the TEK and W KEKs corresponding to the values of each bit in its ID.
Hierarchical key management. In this approach, the
members of the multicast group are part of a tree-like hierarchical structure. The intermediate nodes in the tree assist
in key distribution. We can further classify these schemes
into two different groups, viz., hierarchical node based approaches and hierarchical key based approaches. In the following, the first two schemes are hierarchical node based
and the others are hierarchical key based schemes.
Scalable Multicast Key Distribution (SMKD) protocol [I] uses the Core Based Tree (CBT) architecture for multicasting, for key distribution purposes. The primary core
creates a session key and a key encrypting key (KEK). The
session key, and the KEK are distributed to the secondary
core and subsequently to other nodes as they become part of
the distribution tree.
Iolus [ I l l proposes the idea of hierarchical subgrouping for scalable secure multicasting. Group security agents
share a secret key with each of their subgroup members.
Similarly a group security controller distributes a secret key
to the top level subgroup. All these keys serve the purpose of
key encrypting keys while session keys are distributed during multicast data transfers.
The Centralized Tree-Based Key Management (CTKM)
scheme has been proposed separately by three research
groups [4, 14, 151. Members of the multicast group are
leaf nodes of the key distribution tree. Each member shares
a unique KEK with the group manager. In addition, each

member receives all the KEKs corresponding to the internal
nodes in its path to the root of the tree. The root’s key is the
traffic encrypting key (TEK).
Distributed flat key management: This protocol is a
distributed version of CFKM-DMG described earlier in this
section (refer to [4]). There is no group manager in this
scheme. Each member of the multicast is trusted and no one
holdskreates more than one traffic encrypting key and W
key encrypting keys where W is the number of bits in the binary representation of member IDS. Members joining early
generate the keys and are called key holders. The ones joining late, receive keys from these key holders.
Tabular comparison. In summary, we list the merits
and the shortcomings of existing secure scalable multicasting protocols in Table 5 . We first define the terminology
used in the table of comparison. In particular, n denotes the
number of members in the multicast group, 1 represents the
number of subgroups in the group, and 1 denotes the average subgroup size. c denotes the number of children of the
sender of the multicast data and d represents the degree of
a hierarchical distribution tree. The inter-relations between
these parameters are 0 5 55 d , 1 x & and 1 5 c 5 d .
Note that we list CTKM in the table as a representative for CFKM-DMG and the distributed flat scheme, which
are variations of CTKM. The hierarchical scheme uses the
largest number of keys while the flat schemes use fewer
keys. In all these schemes the session key is modified
each time a host joins/leaves. Some of the KEKs are also
changed. The number of KEKs updated is different in each
of these protocols. Consequently, all these protocols suffer
from 1 affects n scalability problem. Also, the distributed
flat scheme is vulnerable to security attacks from members
of the group. Both the flat schemes also cannot exclude colluding members [4].

4. Conclusions
In this paper, we proposed a dual encryption scheme for
scalable secure multicasting. We use hierarchical subgrouping to support scalability. Group control authority is delegated to subgroup managers. We use two sets of key encrypting keys to provide the capability to deny access of
multicast data to the subgroup managers. Members of the
multicast group receive both the key encrypting keys. Subgroup managers also need to join the group to get access
to multicast data. Alternatively, they can participate in the
multicast assisting in key distribution and access control.

7

Authorized licensed use limited to: University of Nebraska - Lincoln. Downloaded on March 11,2010 at 21:02:25 EST from IEEE Xplore. Restrictions apply.

ETM

SMKD

GKMP

PDKD

Iolus

CTKM

DEP

Yes

Yes
No

Yes
Yes

No

Yes

No

No

Yes
No

Yes
Yes

Yes

No

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

00)

O(logdn)
O(dlogdn)

O(7)

O(1)

O(1)

O(l+c)

Access control mechanism
Capability certificate

No

Join scalability
Leave scalability
Data transmission scalability
I affects n scalability

Yes
Yes
No
Yes

No. of messages at join

O(I)

No. of messages at leave

O(1)

Total key encryptions during data transmission
No. of key encryptions at the sender

O(n)

Intermediate

nodes

O(n)

-

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

O(1)

O(1)

O(n)

O(1)

O(I )

O( 1)

O( I )

O(1)

O(I)

O(I)

-

-

Trusted

Yes
Yes

O(I)

O(I)

O(I)

O(c)

Trusted

Not trusted

Not trusted

S.E. Deering and D. R. Cheriton. Multicast Routing in Datagram lnternetworks and Extended LANs. ACM Transactions
on Computer Systems, 8(2):85-1 IO, May 1990.
R. Ganesan. The Yaksha Security System. Communications
ofthe ACM, 39(3):55-60, March 1996.
L. Gong. Enclaves: Enablins Secure Collaboration Over the
Internet. IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, 15(3):567-575, April 1997.
L. Gong and N. Shacham. Elements of trusted multicasting.
In Proc. IEEE Intl. Conf: on Network Protocols, pages 2330, Boston, MA, USA, October 1994.
H. Harney and C. Muckenhirn. Group Key Management
Protocol (GKMP) Architecture. RFC 2094, July 1997.
A. Menezes, P. van Oorschot, and S. Vanstone. Handbook of
Applied Cryptography. CRC Press series on discrete mathematics and its applications. CRC Press, 1997.
S. Mittra. lolus: A Framework for Scalable Secure Multicasting. In Proc. ACM SICCOMM, pages 277-288, Cannes,
France, September 1997.
R. L. Rivest, A. Shamir, and L. M. Adleman. A Method
for Obtaining Digital Signatures and Public-key Crypto Systems. Communications ofthe ACM, 21:120-126, 1978.
W. Stallings. Network and Internetwork Security. PrenticeHall Inc., 1995.
D. Wallner, E. Harder, and R. Agee. Key Management for
Multicast: Issues and Architecture. IETF Draft, July 1997.
C. K. Wong, M. Gouda, and S. S. Lam. Secure group communications using key graphs. In Proc. ACM SICCOMM,
August 1998.

We are working on the development of a prototype of our
secure multicasting framework. We plan to use the prototype to quantify the appropriate subgroup size, the number
of subgroups and the number of key encrypting keys based
on group size and the physical distribution of members in the
group. The next phase is to extend our protocol to support
many-to-many secure group communication.
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